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AT A GLANCE
•• Agricultural by-products 
are the greatest source of 
pollution in many of the 
nation’s waterways.
•• Economists believe that 
enabling point source 
polluters to purchase 
pollution rights from 
agricultural non-point 
source polluters can 
reduce the costs for point 
source polluters to meet 
increasingly strict permit 
requirements.
•• Over the past couple 
decades, a range of 
market-based water 
pollution reduction 
programs have been tried 
and many have failed—
some were short-lived, 
while others resulted in 
little cost savings.
Stormwater runoff from cropland and livestock farms carries nutrient-laden manure, chemicals 
(such as fertilizers, herbicides, and 
insecticides), sediment, and bacteria. 
People refer to this runoff as “non-
point source” (NPS) water pollution 
because it comes from many different 
sources spread over a wide area. These 
agricultural by-products make their 
way into our rivers and streams, where 
they can cause significant harm. In fact, 
they are often cited as the top source of 
pollution in United States waterways. 
Agricultural runoff is a potent problem 
not because specific farmers pollute in 
huge quantities, but because agriculture 
occupies such a large percentage of 
land—relatively small emissions 
per acre can add up to considerable 
cumulative amounts.
Economists have long promoted 
market-based solutions to pollution 
control. Policymakers are now turning 
to the idea of pollution credit markets 
for reducing agricultural runoff. There is 
debate, however, over whether the time 
is yet ripe for this type of approach. 
Dr. Doug Parker at the University of 
Maryland Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics grapples with 
this question. Parker researches the 
complexities confronting water clean-
up efforts and the challenges of using 
pollution credit markets as a policy tool. 
He has assisted with the development of 
a water quality credits trading program 
currently active in Pennsylvania and 
helped develop methods for evaluating 
such programs.
Parker has also been very active in 
the development and implementation 
of Maryland’s NPS water quality 
credits trading program. While 
generally optimistic about its trajectory 
and Maryland’s advantages over 
other programs, Parker cautions that 
important questions remain about 
the effectiveness of this approach. 
In a recent analysis with colleagues 
Charles Abdalla, Tatiana Borisova, and 
Kristen Saacke Blunk, Parker cautions 
policymakers that these programs are 
still nascent and should be viewed as 
preliminary experiments that will help 
create workable credit market systems 
in the future. 
Can aggressive pollution reduction in one sector compensate 
for continued pollution in another? Pollution credit markets are 
designed to make this trade-off work. But is the time ripe for water 
quality credit trading systems to serve as an effective means of 
reducing pollution from farmland? Dr. Doug Parker of the University 
of Maryland is skeptical.
Water Quality Credit Trading
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Source: U.S. EPA, National Water Quality Inventory: 2000 Report, No. 841R02001, 
August 2002.
















Glance continued from page 1
•• The greatest challenges 
for a well-functioning 
water quality credit trading 
system are specifying 
numeric thresholds for 
each pollutant, setting 
baselines for unregulated 
sources, ensuring an active 
supply of pollution credits, 
minimizing transaction costs, 
streamlining regulations and 
communication, and avoiding 
countervailing actions that 
may be induced in other 
areas.
How to Curtail Water Pollution?
Farmers of course have no particular 
desire to pollute. In fact, many 
farmers think of themselves as good 
stewards of the natural environment, 
actively seeking to maintain the 
surrounding ecosystems. Runoff is 
simply an undesirable by-product in 
the production of agricultural goods 
that consumers value. While most 
agricultural producers could probably 
reduce their polluted runoff, doing 
so is costly. Thus, reductions in these 
pollutants are likely to cause higher 
food prices. In addition, for those 
agricultural producers operating with 
a small margin of profit, it may not 
be possible to independently reduce 
runoff without going broke. Given 
the costs, few farmers are likely to 
voluntarily reduce pollutants without 
some extra incentives.
Regulation is one way to create such 
incentives. The imposition of fees on 
polluters who surpass acceptable levels 
of undesirable emissions would likely 
reduce total pollution of factories and 
sewage treatment plants. In the case of 
agricultural runoff, however, monitoring 
and measuring emissions is difficult and 
expensive. While the cumulative effects 
of runoff are observable via water 
quality, it is often impossible to identify 
specific farms as the culprits. Both 
regulators and farmers have difficulty 
determining pollution amounts coming 
from a specific field. Even if runoff 
amounts from each farm could be 
accurately measured, monitoring 
emissions flows from large areas of 
farmland could result in regulation costs 
that exceed the benefits of cleaning up 
the pollution.
Leading Sources of Impairment in Surveyed Rivers and Streams in the United States
Impaired stream miles
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Many argue that imposing strict 
environmental regulations would 
make United States agriculture less 
competitive globally. Farms that are 
forced to lower their pollution must pay 
the cost of pollution avoidance. The 
resulting increase in their production 
costs may make them less competitive 
compared to other nations with more lax 
or non-existent standards.
Given the obstacles to regulation, 
some policymakers have attempted to 
curb runoff through incentive payment 
programs. These entail government 
payments to farmers who voluntarily 
adopt environmentally friendly 
“best management practices.” These 
payments are expensive, however. 
Due to limited budgets and low 
enrollment, incentive payment programs 
have had little success in resolving the 
runoff problem. 
Can Pollution Credit Markets Help?
Where does this leave us? What is 
the best approach to reducing water 
pollution? Could markets through 
which firms can buy and sell the right to 
exceed mandated pollution levels help 
resolve the problem? 
Economists generally favor market-
based approaches over regulatory 
approaches to resolve environmental 
problems. The idea is that, with the 
proper incentive system, private 
individuals will make voluntary 
choices which, when taken as a 
group, maximize the total benefits for 
everyone affected by the decisions. This 
spontaneous action through a market 
mechanism is presumably both more 
sustainable and much less costly than 
a “command and control” regulatory 
approach—all while achieving the same 
(or better) outcome.
Pollution credit markets have long 
been pushed by economists and are 
gaining traction in policy circles. 
Through these systems, pollution-
emitting firms that can reduce their 
pollution at a lower cost than another 
firm may choose to cut their pollution 
beyond the required levels and sell 
the difference to the higher-cost firm. 
For example, one firm might decide 
to decrease its emissions by a certain 
specific amount below its maximum 
level permitted, and then sell the 
right to pollute that same amount to 
another firm that is having difficulty 
lowering its emissions to the required 
level. A system such as this not only 
creates costs for those surpassing their 
limits (negative incentives to promote 
pollution control), but also rewards 
producers who proactively reduce their 
pollutants. It also allows the participants 
to find the most efficient way to lower 
total emissions of the group as a whole 
(which is the end goal, after all). 
Pollution credit markets, where 
successful, thus offer the promise of 
more effective pollution reduction 
and lower overall cost. The cap and 
trade program to limit sulfur dioxide 
Best Management Practices can be used to prevent pollution runoff.  This 
picture shows mulched banks and vegetated soil lifts which will eventually 
be unrecognizable under a lush riparian buffer.  Riparian buffers provide 
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emissions in the United States of 
the early 1990s is often cited as one 
of the most successful types of 
such programs.
Too Early to Work for Agricultural 
Water Pollution? 
The question is whether or not 
pollution credit markets can be 
used to address agricultural water 
quality concerns. Credit trading is 
useful under certain conditions, but 
is the time ripe for water quality 
credit trading systems to serve as 
an effective means of reducing 
agricultural runoff pollution? 
Many economists have argued the 
benefits of enabling point source (PS) 
polluters, such as urban wastewater 
treatment plants, to purchase 
pollution rights from agricultural 
NPS polluters. A successful 
program would provide PS polluters 
flexibility in how to achieve the 
pollution limits set for them. This 
flexibility would in turn free up their 
resources  for discovering better 
pollution abatement methods in 
their own industries. At the same 
time, PS polluters would make 
payments to farmers that would 
finance agricultural best management 
practices and help the PS polluters 
meet their pollution caps. 
Maintaining individual flexibility 
enables both PS and NPS polluters 
to collectively find the most cost-
effective way to reduce the overall 
flow of water pollution.
Sounds great, right? To this end, 
there have been several recent policy 
moves at the federal and state level 
towards implementing pollution 
credit markets to improve water 
quality. But how well does this 
approach really work? 
Challenges for Water Pollution 
Credit Trading Systems
Parker explains that, in order for a 
water pollution rights trading system 
to function successfully, several key 
challenges must first be overcome. 
(For a more comprehensive 
description of the critical elements 
required for a water quality trading 
program, see “Water Quality 
Credit Trading and Agriculture: 
Recognizing the Challenges and 
Policy Issues Ahead,” Choices, 
22(2), 2007).1 One of the most 
important requirements is specifying 
actual numeric thresholds for each 
pollutant. This poses substantial 
difficulty in the case of agricultural 
water quality, as it requires 
translating broad public water quality 
goals (such as having a healthy 
fish habitat) into specific numeric 
thresholds for each pollutant. It may 
be difficult to accurately estimate 
Recent Moves towards Water Quality 
Credit Trading Systems 
Federal Level 
2003 – The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) issued a trading policy allowing industrial and 
municipal point sources to buy credits from farmers 
who implemented measures to improve water 
quality. These credits could be used by point source 
polluters to help them attain their own maximum 
allowed discharges.
2006 – The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
reached an agreement with the EPA to promote 
water quality credit trading.
2007 – The USDA stated that it views market-
based solutions as an important tool in federal 
environmental protection efforts in agriculture.
State Level
By 2009 – Maryland, Oregon, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia all passed legislation or 
created programs to promote water quality trading.
A range of market-based water pollution reduction 
programs have been tried over the last two decades 
and many have failed. Some were short-lived, 
while others resulted in little trading of credits. A 
few successful examples of water quality credit 
trading systems do exist, though their impact on 
water quality is unclear. Parker and his colleagues 
therefore suggest a more measured approach 
to exploring the ways in which a water quality 
credits trading system might work in the context 
of agricultural water pollution. They also advocate 
viewing current and future programs as experiments 
to help policymakers, analysts, and stakeholders 
learn how serious challenges can be met and 
overcome.
1 Available online at http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2007-2/grabbag/2007-2-06.htm.
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How Farmers Obtain Sellable Credits in the 
New Maryland Program (in a Nutshell)
STEP 1: Select the Nutrient for Which to Sell Credits.
A farmer must first decide which nutrient (phosphorous or 
nitrogen) they will reduce in order to receive and sell credits.
STEP 2: Determine Baseline Requirements for a
Given Nutrient.
Farmers go to a website (www.mdnutrienttrading.org), 
where they enter information about the portion of their farm 
operation they will use to generate credits. A baseline level is 
calculated, depending on the watershed in which the relevant 
field, pasture, or animal area is located.
STEP 3: Determine Whether Additional Best Management 
Practices are Required to Meet Baseline. 
The farmer inputs the current pollution-reduction strategies 
employed on the farm. If this is enough to achieve the 
baseline, the farmer is told that additional practices will earn 
him credits he may resell. If he is still above the baseline, 
he can try entering practices to see the type and number that 
will bring him below the baseline and make him eligible to 
participate in the market.
STEP 4: Implement a Pollutant Reduction Strategy and 
Receive Sellable Credits.
Once the baseline is met, tradable credits can be generated 
from any existing or planned agronomic, structural, or land 
conversion practice that further reduces nutrients.
the amount of pollution reduction needed to 
meet specific water quality goals. Not only must 
a “cap” be set on each emission type, but the 
cap must be consistently enforced for the water 
quality goal to be met.
It is also important to ensure an active supply 
of pollution credits. In order to participate in the 
market by earning and selling credits, farmers 
must reduce their own pollutant loads below a 
proscribed baseline level, usually through the 
implementation of best management practices. 
Farmers can then earn credits through the use of 
additional best management practices. Setting this 
baseline too low may eliminate farmers’ desire to 
participate in the market. The costs of dropping 
below the threshold may not be worthwhile and 
perhaps not even technically feasible. Setting 
the baseline too high (so that it is easy to obtain 
credits) may increase credits supply and increase 
the likelihood of an active market, but result in 
little to no pollution reduction by NPS polluters. 
If this happens, when PS buys credits in order to 
pollute more, the overall pollution level is likely 
to rise instead of fall.
Setting pollution limits also forces 
policymakers to confront questions of fairness. 
Whoever has the most restrictive limits incurs 
costs in order to achieve them—whether by 
buying credits or reducing their own pollution 
levels. Whoever has the least restrictive limits 
may catch a windfall in profits if they can lower 
their emissions below the threshold level at a 
small cost and then sell pollution credits.
Transaction costs—the time and energy 
required for a seller and buyer to find each other, 
verify the credits, and negotiate a trade—are 
another impediment to a well-functioning water 
quality credit trading system. These costs can 
be very high when NPS parties are involved in 
the market. This stems from the fact that NPS 
polluters are widely scattered across a watershed 
and can each provide only a few credits—a PS 
buyer may have to find and buy from many NPS 
sellers. If transaction costs are too high, the 
parties may simply decide trading isn’t worth the 
trouble, and the market will not function. 
The complexity of programs can also add 
transaction costs. Unclear, complicated, and 
non-uniform rules regarding such things as credit 
certification, credit resale, and credit lifespan 
can substantially increase the time and energy 
required to participate in a water quality credits 
market. Streamlining rules and improving 
communication to potential traders might reduce 
these costs.
“Maryland’s non-point source program is 
one of the better ones out there, in terms 
of promoting innovation.”(D. Parker)
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Countervailing actions induced in another area by 
a trading program (known as “leakage”) may also 
neutralize some gains from a water pollution credits 
trading program. It is therefore important to design the 
program in such a way that minimizes the potential for 
inducing negative effects in other watersheds and that 
prevents trades which might actually result in a net 
increase in pollution. This could occur due to unintended 
side effects of a credit trading program. For instance, a 
farmer might implement a best management practice in 
order to earn and sell credits, but he must reduce the size 
of his cropland in the process. He may compensate for the 
loss by expanding his productive acreage in a different 
location and increase runoff in another area. 
While the challenges confronting implementation 
of effective water quality credit trading systems are 
significant, a few programs have met them with a degree 
of success. Several trading programs appear to have 
successfully brought in both PS and agricultural NPS 
polluters. Trading programs in the Miami Watershed of 
Ohio; the South Nation River Basin in Ontario, Canada; 
Beet Sugar Cooperative and Rahr Malting Pollutant 
Offsets in Minnesota; and Red Cedar River in Wisconsin 
combine elements of market-based trading programs and 
government-managed tax and subsidy schemes. These 
programs address some of the challenges confronting 
water quality credits trading with intermediaries between 
buyers and sellers. The intermediaries reduce transactions 
costs of finding buyers and sellers, verifying credits, 
and monitoring pollution levels. They also bear some of 
the liability for delivering actual pollution reductions, 
relieving potential buyers from some of the burden 
and increasing the buyers’ willingness to participate 
in the system.
The Future of Water Quality Credit Trading Programs: 
Maryland and Beyond
Parker notes that Maryland’s water quality credit 
trading program is one of the best and most flexible 
programs for promoting farmer innovation in runoff 
After years of nutrient and sediment pollution in 
the Chesapeake Bay, the significant impairments to 
water quality led partners in the regional Chesapeake 
Bay Program to set ambitious targets for nutrient 
pollution reduction by 2010. 
By 2003, teams in Maryland developed strategies—
including pollution caps—to decrease nutrients 
entering all major tributaries and the bay. Given these 
caps, Pennsylvania needed to reduce the nutrients 
flowing across state lines. In 2006, Pennsylvania’s 
nutrient trading policy included point source to 
nonpoint source trades. Virginia also established a 
trading program between point sources with the intent 
to eventually include nonpoint sources in trades.
Maryland announced its own trading program 
in 2008.The West Virginia program is still in 
development.
It is much too soon to judge how successful water 
quality credit trading will be in meeting the collective 












The Genesis of Water Quality Credit Trading in the Chesapeake Bay Region
Courtesy of the Integration and Application Network 
(ian.umces.edu/symbols/)
CANRP  |  Research Brief | Dec. 16, 2011
7
reduction. But he points out that the 
current program is more geared towards 
addressing growth than promoting 
trades. Caps on PS polluters have 
been intentionally set to account for 
growth trends, assuming the pollution 
levels of PS polluters will continue to 
increase. Thus, most PS polluters are 
currently below their caps. The question 
is whether, when they reach their cap, 
they will implement new technology 
to reduce their pollution or instead 
purchase credits from NPS polluters. 
If there are no trades because PS 
polluters find new technologies that 
reduce their pollution better, this may 
be a policy success, even if the credits 
market falters.
The other question for Maryland’s 
program is whether the baseline 
pollution limit that farmers must meet 
to participate in the market is properly 
set. If farmers can obtain credits too 
easily, the supply of credits to the 
market may not result in meaningful 
pollutant reductions.
Market approaches are attractive 
in part because they may reduce 
reliance on government intervention for 
reducing pollution. While some have 
promoted water quality credit trading as 
a substitute for regulating agricultural 
runoff, a certain level of regulation 
and some government involvement is 
required for these markets to function.
In general, policymakers’ 
expectations for the usefulness of 
trading as a tool to address NPS water 
pollution now may be too high. The 
necessary physical and regulatory 
conditions for widespread trading 
simply do not exist in the context of 
NPS pollution. Furthermore, without 
properly set caps, trading by itself may 
not improve pollution outcomes. Since 
most agricultural sources do not face 
an enforceable cap, it is hard to know 
whether even a very active credit market 
will actually improve water quality to 
measurable degrees.
Water quality credit trading in 
agriculture still has too many remaining 
challenges and unresolved questions to 
serve as a reliable pollution reduction 
tool. While it should continue to be 
explored and empirically tested as 
Josh McGrath of UMD studies poultry manure runoff from corn tillage plots at the 
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an effective tool for the future, it is 
important to recognize that credit 
trading is still very much in its infancy. 
Current trading programs should be 
studied for the design insights they 
can bring to future programs. Greater 
resources should also be brought to 
designing future experiments, involving 
input and analysis from economists, 
physical scientists, policymakers, 
farmers, community members, and 
other stakeholders. This will help build 
a better understanding of the physical, 
economic, social, legal, and policy 
dimensions of water quality credit 
trading programs in order that it may 
develop into a more effective pollution 
reduction tool.  n
For more information about 
this research, contact 
Dr. Doug Parker at 
(510) 987-0037 or
dparker@arec.umd.edu.
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